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7  External Debt Management 
7.1  Introduction 
In  the preceding chapters we  identified historical and political economy 
factors and  showed  how  they  have influenced  economic policymaking in 
Indonesia.  The  distributional impact of  fiscal policy  (chapter 4)  was  the 
outcome  of  the  interaction  between  the  comparative-advantage-based 
economic program of the technocrats and the political concerns of President 
Soeharto. The pattern of  allocation of  subsidized credit (chapter 5) and the 
granting of monopoly import licenses (chapter 6) showed clearly the need to 
cater to both economic nationalist aspirations and the rent-seeking activities 
of  key  political  allies.  In  this  chapter,  we  will  see  how  these  economic 
policies (especially fiscal policy) have affected the accumulation of external 
debt and  how  the resulting Pertamina crisis set the tone for external debt 
management after mid- 1975. 
7.2  Trial by Fire 
The  Soeharto government is  no  stranger to  external debt management, 
having inherited an external public debt of  $2 billion. It cut its teeth on the 
economic  stabilization and  rehabilitation program  of  1966,  within  which 
rescheduling the  Soekarno debts and  arranging for new  capital inflows to 
support the balance of payments were key components. The situation was 
grim.  Indonesia  had  defaulted  on  its  1965  debt  service  because  the 
swingeing current account deficits of  1961  -65  had completely drained the 
foreign exchange reserves and turbulent domestic conditions had caused the 
country to be  shut out from the private external credit market. Faced with 
debt payments (including arrears) of  $530 million for  1966, which was 70 
percent of  GDP and  132 percent of exports, Indonesia requested a meeting 
with its debtors to organize her debt.' 
The  result  of  the  debt  rescheduling  meetings  that  year  in  Tokyo 
(September) and in Paris (December) was that the major Western countries 
gave Indonesia the following: 
100 percent relief from principal and interest payments on credits of more 
than  180 days, related to contracts effective prior to July  1, 1966 [and 
which were due in 1966 and 19671. The new schedule of payments [was] 
to start January 1, 1971, after a 4-year grace period, and the rescheduled 
or refinanced amount [was] to be repaid over a period of eight years on an 
ascending scale starting at 5 percent in  1971 and reaching 20 percent in 
1978 . . . The Paris meeting also reaffirmed that, in respect of the interest 
rate  on  the  rescheduled payments,  interest during  the  respective grace 
periods (moratorium interest) should not exceed 4 percent per annum; that 115  IndonesidChapter 7 
this interest should not  be  payable during the grace periods, and  when 
paid, should not be compounded. (World Bank  1968, 54-55) 
Given  the  desperate  situation  of  Indonesia,  the  Western  countries 
established the IGGI to draw up a long-term plan of official assistance and to 
coordinate  the  form  of  aid  to  maximize  its  effectiveness.  To  ensure 
maximum institutional flexibility, IGGI  was  not  given formal  status and, 
operationally, 
The  IGGI  is  a  series  of  meetings  between  Indonesia  and  its  donor 
countries and organizations; it is not based on an international agreement, 
nor do its conclusions and recommendations represent such agreements. 
(Posthumus 1971, 7) 
The terms of IGGI lending were kept as soft as possible: repayment period 
of twenty-five years, including seven years of grace, and an interest rate of 3 
percent.  IGGI  was  also generous in  the  amount  of  official assistance it 
granted (in millions of  dollars): 1967, 167.3; 1968, 361.2; 1969/70, 507.7; 
1970/71, 609.7; 1971/72, 633.7; and  1972/73, 670.0 requested (Posthumus 
1972). 
The mix of  generous external assistance and corrective economic policies 
implemented by  the Soeharto government imparted a new  dynamism to the 
Indonesian economy and  boosted it to a higher  growth path.  The annual 
average growth rate from  1968 to  1972 was  8.2 percent compared to the 
average rate of  1.2 percent in the preceding five years. 
7.3  Debt Management in the 1970s 
The  inflow  of  foreign resources to  finance government  spending  was 
substantial in the early days of the Soeharto regime. They financed 20 to 28 
percent of total government expenditure from 1967 to 1972/73. Since 1968, 
all of  foreign borrowing has been officially designated in the budget under 
the development expenditure category. Whether Indonesia’s dependence on 
external  funds has  decreased  or  increased  in  the  1970s depends  on  the 
measure of  dependence. If  the focus is strictly on the actual financing of 
government expenditure, then the role of foreign borrowing has diminished. 
The ratio of  foreign resources to  expenditure declined secularly from 27 
percent in 1969/70 to  17 percent in 1979/80 (see table 7.1). The growth of 
the petroleum and LNG sector since 1971 brought in  tax revenues at a rate 
faster than the rise in government expenditure, hence reducing the role of 
foreign financing. 
On the other hand, if  the issue of  foreign borrowing rests on fears of  an 
excessive debt-service burden in the future, then an appropriate measure of 
external financial dependence is the amount of annual government borrowing 
in the international markets normalized by  the GDP.  The movement of  this Table 7.1  Trends in Aggregate Expenditure and Revenue, FY1969 to FY1979 (in billions ofrupiahs) 
69/70  70171  71172  72173  73/74  74175  75176  76/77  77/78  78179 
Total expenditure  342.7  467.8  557.0  736.3  1,164.2  1,977.9  2,730.3  3,684.3  4,305.7  5,299.3 
Total revenue  251.6  354.7  440.0  590.6  967.7  1,753.7  2,241.9  2,906.0  3.534.4  4,266.1 
Foreign borrowing  91.1  113.1  117.0  145.7  196.5  224.2  488.4  778.3  771.3  1,033.2 
As percentage 
of  expenditure  26.6  24.2  21.0  19.8  16.9  11.3  17.9  21.1  17.9  19.5 
As percentage 
of GDP  3.4  3.5  3.2  3.2  2.9  2. I  3.9  5.0  4.1  4.3 
GDP deflator 
(1980= 100)  13.9  15.4  16.3  18.5  24.6  36.2  40.7  46.6  52.7  58.4 
Memo item 
79/80  80181 
Total expenditure  8,076.0  11,716.1 
Total revenue  6,696.8  10,227.0 
Foreign borrowing  1.379.2  1,489.1 
As percentage 
of  expenditure  17.1  12.7 
As  percentage 
of  GDP  4.0  3.0 
GDP deflator 
(1980= loo)  77.4  100.0 
Memo item 
81182  82/83  83/84  84/85  85/86  86/87  87/88 
13,917.6  14,355.9  18,311.0  19,380.8  22,824.6  21,421.6  23,583.2 
12,212.6  12,418.3  14,432.7  15.905.5  19,252.8  17,832.5  17,236.1 
1,705.0  1,937.6  3,878.3  3,475.3  3,571.8  3,589.1  6,347.1 
12.3  13.5  21.2  17.9  15.6  16.8  26.9 
2.9  3. I  5.3  4.0  3.7  3.5  5 .9 
111.2  119.6  136.3  152.6  165.8  170.9  176.0 117  IndonesidChapter 7 
measure  in  the  face  of  the  rapid  economic  growth  which  Indonesia 
experienced indicates the  extent  to  which  the  government  had  mobilized 
internal resources to replace foreign credit in  development financing. The 
ratio  of  foreign  borrowing  to  GDP  showed  a  slight  increase,  from  2.9 
percent  in  1970-74  to  4.5  percent  in  1975-79.  This  resource  inflow 
measured in real terms-foreign  borrowing normalized on the GDP deflator 
indexed on  198Cwas  Rp 657 billion in  1969-70  and Rp  1,468 billion in 
1977178, a doubling of  the annual inflow in eight years. 
The continued heavy borrowing was partly the result of the government’s 
unwillingness  to  increase taxes by  broadening its  tax  base  and  partly  the 
result of  the greater availability of  foreign credit at favorable interest rates. 
By  1974  international  credit  markets  had  rescinded  whatever  credit 
restrictions they had imposed on borrowing by the Indonesian government in 
the  aftermath of  Soekamo’s  economic Armageddon.  Three  reasons  were 
responsible for this change: one, the avalanche of oil revenue increased the 
creditworthiness of  the Indonesian government; two,  there  was  a boom  in 
commodity  prices  in  the  early  1970s; and,  three,  lending  opportunities 
decreased in OECD countries whose medium-term economic prospects were 
rather bleak after the 1973 OPEC price increase. 
The  eagerness  of  the  international  financial  community  to  lend  to 
Indonesia is best captured by  the casualness with which it committed $10.5 
billion in loans (as of  February 1975) to  the state oil company, Pertamina, 
most  of  it  in  the  two  years  before  1975. These  loans  were  extended  to 
Pertamina without access to any detailed official financial statements of the 
oil company! 
The improvement in the creditworthiness of Indonesia can be clearly seen 
by  comparing the years  1970 and  1980 in table 7.2. Of  the $12.5 billion 
increase in publicly-guaranteed debt in  this  period,  41 percent of  it  came 
from private creditors. Concessionary lending from official creditors was no 
longer the only important source of  external funds, and it was only natural 
after 1973 that official loans declined. The IGGI  loans were no  longer as 
eagerly  sought  after  the  OPEC-I  oil  price  increase  because  the  advice 
(“policy  recommendations”)  which  was  dispensed  with  the  loans  was 
resented in many circles as a foreign intrusion into the domestic policymaking 
process.  Furthermore,  the  newfound  petroleum  wealth  of  the  Indonesian 
economy reduced the intensity of  the charitable feelings which made con- 
cessionary loans possible in the first place. 
The  ending  of  private  credit  rationing  against  Indonesia  was  amply 
justified by  political and economic developments. Since 1970 the Soeharto 
regime had been firmly in power with neither strong domestic opposition nor 
outstanding regional tension being a credible threat. On the economic front, 
the export sector showed an amazing ability to earn foreign exchange and the 
economy  was  increasingly  showing  signs  of  growing  beyond  7  percent 
annually. Despite the sixfold increase in  debt between  1970 and  1980, the Table 7.2  External Public and Publicly-Guaranteed Debt" of Indonesia, 1970-80 
1970  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
Debt outstanding and undisbursed 
Debt outstanding and disbursed (DOD) 
Private creditors 
Total debt service (TDS) 
Private creditors 





Proportion of  DOD which: 
Is concessionary 
Bears variable i-rates 
Is from private creditors 
Proportion of debt service paid 
to private creditors 






















































































19,037.3  21,199.8  24,451.9 
13.149.7  13,277.8  14,971.3 
4,761.1  4,767.8  5,464.9 
2.062. I  2,099.6  1,758.5 
1.632.9  1,535.7  1,127.6 
116.3  85.5  67.4 
26.6  27. I  21.6 
18.2  13.5  7.9 
4.2  4.3  2.5 
53.2  51.5  50.2 
15.0  14.5  16.8 
36.2  35.9  36.5 
79.2  73.1  64.  I 
1,312.0  3,282.3  5,868.4 
Note:  Central Bank  assets  position calculated  from Infernational Financial  Srutisrics data  prior to February  1987, using  series  I1 and  16c. Bank  Indonesia 
changed its valuation procedures in February 1987. The new procedures caused net asset position to improve quite substantially. 
"Debt reported is end of period,  in  millions of  U.S. dollars. 
bXGS = export of goods and services. 119  IndonesidChapter 7 
debvexport ratio fell from 206 percent to 67 percent, and the debt/GNP ratio 
fell from 27 percent to 22 percent. The eagerness of  the banks to extend 
credit  appears  to  have  been  matched by  the  eagerness of  the  Indonesian 
public  sector  to  borrow.  It  was  quite  normal  for  Indonesia to  contract 
additional loan commitments even when it was unable to spend these funds 
quickly enough. The ratio of  funds drawn to  the total committed was 61 
percent in 1980 compared to 83 percent in  1970. 
It  must  be  mentioned at this  point  that  there  is no  paradox in  why  in 
1970-80  the debt-service/export and debt-service/GNP ratios went up as the 
debvexport and  debVGNP ratios moved down. The rise in the former two 
ratios  was  a good sign  in  this  case because  it  meant  that  Indonesia had 
regained access to the private capital market. The increase in the DSRs was 
inevitable for two reasons. First, Indonesia was now borrowing an increasing 
proportion of  its loans at market interest rates rather than at concessionary 
IGGI rates. Only 50 percent of the outstanding long-term Indonesian debt in 
1980 was concessionary compared with 78 percent in  1970. Second, private 
credit generally has a shorter maturity than official credit. In  1970 only 11 
percent of total debt was owed to private creditors compared with 37 percent 
in  1980. So it is not that the Indonesian DSRs in  1980 were high, but that 
these ratios were unusually low in 1970. The low 1970 DSRs were the result 
of  Indonesia being  shut off  from the  private credit market and  of  IGGI 
having  to  forward  emergency  loans  at  3  percent  to  help  the  Soeharto 
government weather its inherited financial crisis. The point is that the higher 
DSRs in  1980 were the result of  an economic situation superior to that in 
1970. 
On consumption-smoothing grounds, readmission into the external credit 
market resulted in a net gain to Indonesian national welfare. This welfare 
gain was not  without its price, however, as Indonesia was now exposed to 
two  new  risks.  The  first risk  is  systemic  in  nature  and  threatens every 
country  with  external debts.  An  example of  such  a  systemic risk  is  the 
simultaneous collapse of  a debtor’s export earnings and  a large increase in 
the real rate of  interest. 
The  second  new  risk  is  the  possibility  of  imprudent  borrowing  by 
Indonesia. This danger was realized in February 1975 when Pertamina could 
not roll over a $400 million short-term loan and defaulted. The government 
bailed  Pertamina out  by  guaranteeing repayment of  all  of  its debts.  The 
enormity of  the Pertamina rescue operation is clearly indicated by  the jump 
in  the principal ratios in  table 7.2. The debvexport ratio jumped from 85 
percent in  1974 to  114 percent in  1975, and it returned to the 85 percent 
level only  in  1979. By  taking  over Pertamina’s debts,  the proportion of 
private credit to total credit jumped by  10 percentage points-a  magnitude 
unprecedented and  not repeated. It  is clear that most of  Pertamina’s debt 
bore variable interest rates because the percentage of  variable interest rate 
loans almost trebled from 1974 to 1975 (see table 7.1). 120  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
7.4  The Pertamina Debt Crisis 
Pertamina, on the eve of the crisis, was more than an oil company.* It was 
an  extremely  diversified  conglomerate  with  the  distinction  of  being  the 
largest corporation in Asia outside of Japan. Table 7.3 gives a partial listing 
of  the range of  businesses engaged in by Pertamina. 
As discussed earlier, one of Soeharto’s key operating styles is to appoint a 
“dynamiser”  to solve problems of  industrial development and to grant him 
broad discretion in achieving the goals. General Ibnu Sutowo, who became 
chairman of  the National  Oil Committee  in  1966 and president-director  of 
Pertamina in  1968, lived up to the “dynamiser”  image. Oil production rose 
from less than half  a million  barrels a day in  1966 to  1.4 million  barrels a 
day in  1973. Furthermore, it was widely accepted that General Sutowo had 
driven  a hard  bargain  with the oil companies,  receiving  terms which were 
more  favorable  than  those  received  by  the  Saudis  (Hunter  1967).  His 
innovative  “production-sharing’’  scheme avoided  many  of  the  monitoring 
difficulties of  the  “posted  price”  approach adopted by the Gulf states. 
Table 7.3  F’ertamina Subsidiaries and Joint Ventures 
Company and Status  Functions 
Whollv owned subsidiaries in Indonesia 
PT  Electronika Nusantara (Elnusa) 
PT  Palembang Rice Estate 
PT  Patra Jasa 
PT  Pelita Air Service 
Pertamina Gulf Industrial Processing 
PT  Pertamina Tongkang 
Wholly owned subsidiaries outside lndonesia 
Ocean Petrol Ltd. (Hong Kong) 
Joinr ventures in lndonesia 
PT Arun Natural Gas Liquefaction Co. (Pertamina 
PT  Badak Natural Gas Liquefaction Co. (Pertamina 
PT  Brown and Root Indonesia  (Pertamina 20%; 
55%; Mobil 30%; Jilco 15%) 
556;  Huffco 30%; Jilco 15%) 
Brown & Root USA 80%) 
PT Chicago Bridge and Iron lndonesia (Pertamina 
51%; Chicago Bridge and Iron Co.. USA 49%) 
Services for marine, land, and offshore opera- 
tions 
Large-scale rice project in South Sumatra 
Providing facilities to oil and service contrac- 
tors (offices, housing, and land transport) 
Air services 
Packaging of fertilizer and other chemical 
products 
Operating non-vessel tankers 
Operating and managing ocean-going tankers 
Processing and sale of  LNG produced  in Aceh 
Processing and sale of LNG produced  in East 
Kalimantan 
Manufacture of components and appurtenances 
for offshore constructions; concrete coating 
of steel pipes: design and construction of 
processing plants and engineering works for 
oil and gas; procurement  and storage of ma- 
terials 
To  furnish metal plate structure, process facili- 
ties equipment, and construction services 
throughout Indonesia for government agen- 
cies of Indonesia  and companies operating in 
Indonesia 121  IndonesidChapter 7 
Table 7.3  (continued) 
Company and Status  Functions 
PT  Dresser Magcobar (Pertamina  10%; Dresser 
FT  Indonesia Chemical Co. (Pertamina 60%; PT 
Magcobar. USA 90%) 
Sempurna  10%; Teijin Ltd and Toyo Menka 30%) 
PT  Krakatau Steel (infrastructure; on behalf of the 
FT  Kuda Laut Batam Island (Pertamina 50%; Intera- 
PT  Nippon Steel Construction (Nisconi) (Pertamina 
GOI, $6  million) 
gencies Hong Kong 50%) 
10%;  Nippon Steel Japan 90%) 
PT  Patra Vickers Batam (Pertamina 50%; Vickers 
Ruwolt Australia 50%) 
PT  Permiko Engineering and Construction (Pertam- 
ina  10%;  Nippon Kokan KK  and Mitsubishi 90%) 
FT  F'ertafenikki (Pertamina 30%; Japan Gasoline 
Pexa Oil Co. (Pertamina 25%; Pexa Oil Co. 75%) 
IT  Burna Bina Indonesia (Pertamina 51%; Bechtel 
PT  Sankyu International (Pertamina 10%;  Sankyu 
PT Toyo Kanetsu (Pertamina 51%; Toyo Kanetsu 
60%;  Far East Trading Co. 10%) 
Inc. 49%) 
Tokyo 90%) 
35%: Nissho lwai  14%) 
Joint ventures outside Indonesia 
Far East Oil Trading Co. Ltd. (Japan) (Pertamina 
50%; various Japanese companies 50%) 
Indonesian Enterprises Ltd., USA (Pertamina 50%; 
vanous companies 50%) 
Japan-Indonesia LNG Import Co. (Jilco) (Pertamina 
15% through Far East Oil Trading Co.; five Japa- 
nese companies 5  I %;  Tokyo Electric and Tokyo 
Gas 4%; Industrial Bank of Japan 6%; Nisano 
Iwai 15%; other trading companies 9%) 
Japan Indonesian Oil Kabushiki (Pertamina 50%; 
Toyota Motor Sales Co., The Tokyo Electric 
Power Co., The Kansai Electric Power Co., The 
Chuba Electric Power Co.. Maruzen Oil Co.. 
Daikyo Oil Co., ldemitsu Kosan Co., total 50%) 
Perta Oil Co.. USA (Pertamina 50%;  United States 
International Investment Corp. 50%) 
Tugu Insurance Co. Ltd., Hong Kong (Pertamina 
40%; private investors 64%) 
Mud for drilling 
To produce annually  100,000 tons of peravele 
and  120,000 tons of dimethyl telethalate 
(DMT) in South Sumatra 
To rehabilitate and operate the abandoned So- 
viet steel mill project at Cilegon 
Supply frozen and dry foodstuffs 
To provide support for oil and gas industry 
including: fabrication, assembling, and con- 
struction of steel structures; coating of  gas 
and oil pipes; supply storage and servicing 
Heavy engineering facilities to  service the oil, 
mineral processing extraction,  and other 
manufacturing industries. 
Fabrication, coating, assembly, installation.  and 
construction of pipelines and steel structures 
for oil and gas exploration drilling; produc- 
tion and distribution; supply of  services in- 
cluding design, inspection, testing, repairing, 
and surveying for gas and oil; storage and 
lease of goods and equipment related to 
these 
Consulting engineering 
Oil exploration onshore South and East Kali- 
Engineering consulting 
Fabrication, assembling,  installation,  and con- 
struction of pipelines and steel structures 
Engineering consulting 
mantan 
Marketing of crude oil in  Japan 
Promotion of  tourism in the USA 
To supply the low sulphur crude oil produced 
in Indonesia to Japan, and other associated 
matters 
Transport and marketing of Indonesian crude 
Insurance 
oil 
Source:  Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studiey (July  1974) 122  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
Sutowo’s ability to get things done, albeit many times by  paying a high 
premi~m,~  resulted in him being asked by the president to take over lagging 
projects. The biggest of  such projects was the completion of the Krakatau 
Steel  Mill  for  which  Pertamina  had  assumed responsibility  in  1970 and 
which had been abandoned uncompleted by the Soviet Union in 1966. Partly 
by  allowing itself to be volunteered to take over the management of  more 
and  more  state projects,  and partly  because of  Sutowo’s desire to play  a 
pioneering role in Indonesian economic development, Pertamina developed 
into an autonomous development agency independent of  the control of  the 
technocrats at BAPPENAS. Pertamina improved harbors, developed residen- 
tial and commercial estates, and built roads and hospitals. 
Although  these  expanded  activities  of  Pertamina  intruded  upon  the 
economic policymaking turf of the technocrats, there was not much domestic 
pressure which they could bring to reverse this state of  affairs. There were 
good  reasons  why  the  president  chose  to  maintain  the  status  quo  with 
Pertamina. An  obvious one was that criticisms of  a success story were hard 
to  make  stick,  especially  when  Pertamina’s  largess  had  won  it  many 
supporters in the president’s circle.  An  equally important reason could be 
that  General Ibnu  Sutowo had  come to  epitomize  the  kind  of  economic 
nationalism favored by  a large segment of the military and the intellectuals. 
As  explained in  chapter  3, one  thorny  problem  of  Indonesian economic 
development  has  been  the  disproportionate  economic  power  of  the 
Indonesian Chinese community. General Sutowo’s much heralded success as 
a big-time businessman  was  a source of  considerable ethnic pride.  It  was 
widely held in some intellectual circles that the only effective containment of 
Chinese  economic  strength  was  to  allow  the  small  number  of  capable 
priburni entrepreneurs to each head a gigantic state enterprise modelled after 
the Japanese zaibatsu.  It  was believed  that  only  such  gigantic enterprises 
could reap the economies of  scale and sustain the short-term losses of  an 
infant industry. 
What was really  alarming to the technocrats who had gone through the 
trials  of  rescheduling  Soekamo’s  debts  was  that  this  new  independent 
development agency was now borrowing heavily in the international credit 
market to finance its nonoil activities. In March  1972 the minister of finance 
chose to enter into another standby agreement with the IMF, even after the 
IMF  had  concluded that  a  balance-of-payments crisis  was  unlikely.  The 
standby  agreement set a ceiling of  $14 million on  medium-term external 
borrowing for 1972/73. Given this ceiling, a decree was issued requiring all 
state bodies to seek approval from the Ministry of Finance before contracting 
foreign borrowing. 
Pertamina  ignored  this  decree,  borrowing  $350  million  in  short-and 
medium-term debt in 1972 without informing the Ministry of Finance. When 
this transgression came to the attention of the United States, the biggest aid 
donor, American economic aid was suspended. And  in February 1973 U.S. 123  IndonesidChapter 7 
Vice President Spiro Agnew raised the issue of Pertamina’s borrowing with 
President Soeharto. The president’s reaction was very much in line with his 
belief that a talented problem-solver like Sutowo ought to be given free rein. 
Soeharto  “delivered  a  vigorous defense  of  Ibnu  Sutowo,  saying he  had 
personally charged him with important national projects and trusted the oil 
chief to find his own finance”  (McDonald 1980, 155). Nevertheless, when 
U.S. aid resumed, Pertamina stopped borrowing in the medium-term market 
and started financing its long-term projects with short-term loans. 
It  was  this  borrowing  in  the  short-term  market  which  precipitated the 
Pertamina  crisis.  Short  rates  rose  dramatically  after  the  OPEC-1  price 
increase  because  central  banks  in  the  industrialized  countries  began 
tightening their monetary policies to dampen aggregate demand to offset the 
price pressures from the supply side. At the end of  1974, the discount rate 
was 7.8 percent in the United States and 9 percent in Japan, compared with 
their respective 1972 discount rates of  4.5 percent and 4.3 percent.  It was 
also at this time that the international banking community was shocked into 
greater cautiousness by  the  failures of  the  Franklin National Bank  in  the 
United States and the Herstatt Bank in Germany due to foreign exchange 
speculation. The result was that the banks took a harder look at Pertamina’s 
borrowing. 
They were alarmed that they had extended so much credit (it turned out to 
be $10.5 billion) to Pertamina without any one of  them having seen a full 
statement of Pertamina’s finances. While it was true that the future of the oil 
industry  looked  very  promising  in  1975, bankers  were  troubled  because 
significant proportion of the borrowing was for nonoil projects, the debt was 
not guaranteed by  the Indonesian government, and Pertamina was showing 
increasing signs of  mismanagement. In the face of  these reservations, the 
banks refused  to  automatically roll  over  existing  debts  unless  they  were 
given more information about Pertamina’s financial position. The upshot was 
that Pertamina defaulted on 20 February 1975 when it could not meet a $400 
million payment to the Republic National Bank of Dallas. 
The Indonesian government announced that it would assume responsibility 
for Pertamina’s debt,  of  which  $1.5 billion  was in  short-term loans.  The 
rescue operation obligated the Indonesian government to undertake its first 
major borrowing in the external credit market since it had been readmitted 
into  the  private  credit  market.  The  Pertamina  crisis  was  solved  by  a 
combination of repayment, rolling over part of the existing debt into longer 
term  instruments,  and  cancellation of  contracts.  Even  with  access to the 
international financial market, Indonesian resources were still stretched thin. 
The net foreign reserve position of  Bank Indonesia fell from $1.5 billion at 
the end of  1974 to a deficit of $0.7 billion at the end of  1975. 
An  indication of the magnitude of money involved in the rescue operation 
can be  obtained from table 7.4 in which the long-term publicly-guaranteed 
debt  is  divided between  the  government  sector and  the  public  enterprise Table 7.4  Distribution of  External Sovereign Debt’  by Sectors, FYI973  to FYI986 
73/74  74/75  75/76  76/77  77/78  78/79  79/80  SOB1  81/82  82/83  83/84  84/85  85/86  86/87 
Government sector 
Net drawings  562.0  571.0  1,918.0  1,657.0  1,345.0  1,425.0  1.263.0  1,381.0  2,271.0  3,226.0  3,883.0  4,710.0  1,678.0  3,134.0 
Adjustment  571.0  -975.0  -62.0  -787.0  5.0  -471.0  -2,038.0  4,487.0  3,603.0 
Outstanding debt  3,979.0  4,550.0  6,468.0  8,125.0  9,470.0  11,466.0  11,754.0  13,073.0  14,557.0  17,788.0  21,103.0  21,179.0  27,344.0  34,081.0 
Public enterprises 
Net drawings  352.6  555.2  -109.3  50.7  -327.1  -10.0  -73.0  49.0  683.0  1,017.0  77.0  -408.0  -325.0  -383.0 
Adjustments  .O  -  17.0  18.0  -5.0  -122.0  54.0  77.0  41.0  18.0 
Outstanding debt  1,665.5  2,220.7  2,111.4  2,162.1  1,835.0  1,825.0  1,735.0  1,802.0  2,480.0  3,375.0  3,506.0  3,175.0  2,891.0  2,526.0 
Unattributable drawings or 
Total public sector 
adjustments during 1973-77  -118.3  -3.6  -83.5  128.0  726.1 
Net drawings  914.6  1,126.2  1,808.7  1,707.7  1,017.9  1,415.0  1,190.0  1,430.0  2,954.0  4,243.0  3,960.0  4,302.0  1,353.0  2,751.0 
Adjustment plus unattributed sums  -  118.3  -3.6  -83.5  128.0  726.1  571.0  -992.0  -44.0  -792.0  -117.0  -417.0  -1,961.0  4,528.0  3,621.0 
Outstanding debt  5,526.2  6,767.1  8,495.9  10,415.1  12,031.1  13,291.0  13,489.0  14,875.0  17,037.0  21,163.0  24,609.0  24,354.0  30,235.0  36,607.0 
Memo item 
Governmentborrowingforbudget  491.3  559.0  1,184.6  1,888.7  1,863.6  2,105.1  2,204.1  2,382.5  2,685.0  2,877.9  3,947.9  3,314.0  3,189.3  2,544.4 
Government borrowing from 
balance of payments  643.0  660.0  1,995.0  1,823.0  2,106.0  2,208.0  2,690.0  2,684.0  3,521.0  5,011.0  5,793.0  3,519.0  3,432.0  5,296.0 
Ratio of  public enterprise 
to total public sectordebt (%)  30.1  32.8  24.9  20.8  15.3  13.7  12.9  12.1  14.6  15.9  14.2  13.0  9.6  6.9 
Note: Figures for 1978/79 onward are from an IMF document. For the earlier years, net drawing of  public sector is from the World Bank’s World Debt Tables and net drawing of government sector 
is from the balance of  payments. The difference between the two  numbers is attributed to net drawing by public enterprises. The difference between the cumulated Rows and the stocks in the World 
Debt Tables is reported in the “Unattributable  drawings”  item. 
”Debt reported is end of period, in U.S.  dollars. 125  IndonesidChapter 7 
sector.  The  debt  flow  of  1975/76 was  extraordinary  compared  with  the 
preceding two years-the  $1.9 billion increase in the long-term debt of the 
government sector was more than three times that in 1973/74 and  1974/75. 
Four  reasons  have  been  advanced  for  this  large  increase.  The  first  two 
reasons are the conversion of part of the $1.5 billion short-term obligations 
into long-term debt and the amortization of Pertamina’s long-term debt. The 
third reason is that by  1975 the government had been convinced by the 1973 
oil price increase that  the future income stream of  the economy had  been 
markedly  increased.  It  decided,  therefore,  to  embark  on  an  expanded 
program of development spending to be financed by external borrowing. The 
fourth reason is that development expenditure in  1975 overshot its targeted 
level  by  $313 million,  requiring the  government to  undertake  additional 
borrowing. 
Since  detailed  data  on  the  Pertamina  rescue  operation  have  not  been 
released,  any estimates of  how  much of  the  $2.0 billion  worth of  public 
borrowing,  as  shown  in  the  balance-of-payments account,  is  Pertamina- 
related is necessarily speculative. It could be argued that the Pertamina affair 
accounted for only 40 percent of  the  borrowing because $1.2  billion was 
required  to  finance the budget.  On  the  other  hand,  one has  to  take  into 
account that Pertamina had  collected $8 19 million in oil taxes on behalf of 
the Ministry of Finance, which it had kept for its own use. If this oil revenue 
had  been  forwarded  to the government,  only  $365.6 million would  have 
been needed for budgetary reasons. This meant that more than 80 percent of 
the large external borrowing in  1975/76 was caused by the mismanagement 
of ~ertamina.~ 
For the next several years, Pertamina continued to be a drain on the budget 
and obliged the government to undertake additional external borrowing. In 
1976/77 the  government  budget  showed  a  debt-service  transfer  of  $75 
million to Pertamina; in 1977/78 the debt-service transfer was $208 million; 
and  in  1979/80 the  government  extended  a  subsidy  of  $77  million  to 
Pertamina. 
7.5  Economic and Political Effects of the Pertamina Crisis 
Since the 4.9 percent real GDP growth rate in  1975 was the lowest in the 
thirteen-year period from 1968 to 198  1, one may be tempted to attribute the 
drop in aggregate demand to the across-the-board cancellation of Pertamina’s 
numerous investments. We  do not  think  so, however.  Instead, we  believe 
that the large plunge of the  1975 real GDP growth rate from the rates of 9 
percent in 1972, 11 percent in  1973, and 8 percent in  1974, was largely the 
result of  the 1975 global recession induced by  high oil prices. Decomposi- 
tion  of  the  sources of  growth  in  1975 revealed that  it  was  external,  not 
internal,  factors  which  were  responsible  for  the  low  growth  rate:  real 
domestic absorption increased by  17 percent, while real exports fell by  18 
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The  level  of  real  government  expenditure  did  grow  more  slowly  in 
1976/77 and 1977/78 because the technocrats deemed it prudent to lower the 
growth  of  external  debt  and,  hence,  diverted  domestic  revenue  to  keep 
Pertamina afloat. If one is looking for a silver lining in the Pertamina crisis, 
it could be argued that the fiscal conservatism of this period was a desirable 
outcome  because  inflation  has  been  above  18  percent  since  1973  and 
economic growth has picked up again.5 
The Pertamina debacle was a major setback to the military advisors who 
favored  the  nationalist zaibatsu  approach to  economic  management.  The 
technocrats at  the  BAPPENAS  and  Ministry of  Finance were  once again 
unchallenged in the sphere of economic policymaking. The technocrats were 
asked  to  oversee  the  reorganization  of  the  Pertamina  empire  and  were 
granted real control over all external borrowing (short- and long-term) by 
state enterprises. 
There is no doubt that the technocrats immediately used this new authority 
not only to sharply curtail foreign borrowing by the state enterprises but also 
to reduce their outstanding debt.  At  the time of  the  Pertamina crisis,  not 
counting short-term debt, the long-term publicly-guaranteed external debt of 
state enterprises stood  at  $2.2 billion,  which  was  33 percent of  the  total 
outstanding public debt.  By  the end of  March  1979, the debt of  the state 
enterprises was reduced to $1.7 billion, which was only  13 percent of  the 
total.  The  days of  Pertamina-style borrowing  by  public  enterprises  were 
clearly over. 
It could be  cogently argued that  the  Pertamina crisis was  a blessing in 
disguise.  By  reminding  the  Indonesian government of  the  importance  of 
being prudent in external borrowing, it could be the reason why Indonesia 
did not experience a debt crisis in  1982. The timing of  the Pertamina crisis 
could not have been better. The real price of  oil was at an all-time high, so 
the international credit markets were willing to roll over the now-guaranteed 
debts;  and  the  real  interest  rate  was  low,  so  the  debt  burden  was  not 
increased disproportionately. 
If  Pertamina  had  not  been  prevented  from  further  borrowing  in  the 
medium-term credit  market  and  had,  therefore,  over-reached itself  in  the 
short-term credit market, it could have accumulated by  1982 a foreign debt 
at least as big  as  the  $20 billion debt of  PEMEX,  the Mexican state oil 
company. After all, in February 1975 Pertamina already had $10.5 billion in 
loans (including undisbursed), and the  1979 OPEC-2 price increase would 
have  further expanded its  ability to borrow. The failure of  an  unchecked 
Pertamina in  1982 would have had cataclysmic effects on the economy. Not 
only would the record high real interest rates of  1982 have made the debt 
service painful, but the lower oil prices would have forced the implementa- 
tion  of  more  draconian  austerity  policies.  By  denying  all  state-owned 
enterprises direct access to the external credit market after the Pertamina 
embarrassment, Indonesia did not have as large a debt as it otherwise would 127  IndonesidChapter 7 
have had when it entered 1982. With the benefit of hindsight, the Pertamina 
debacle  could  certainly  be  viewed  as  a  vaccination  against  excessive 
borrowing. 
It is important to note that the Pertamina crisis did not reduce the role of 
the army in the management of state and private enterprises. The doctrine of 
dwijiingsi remained intact. For example, even though the technocrats were 
asked to reorganize Pertamina, it was an army man, General Piet Haryono, 
not  a  civilian administrator, who  was  appointed to replace  General Ibnu 
Sutowo. And it  was another army man who succeeded General Haryono in 
1981. The point is that it is vital for the army to control key sectors of  the 
economy, partly because of the political need to channel resources to retain 
the support of the military and partly because of the president’s belief that a 
‘  ‘dynamiser”  should  have  discretionary  funds  available  for  off-budget 
development  projects.  The  legacy  of  the  Pertamina  crisis  is  that  these 
extrabudgetary allocations are now unlikely to lead to an external debt crisis. 
7.6  External Debt in the 1980s 
The Pertamina crisis also resulted in major changes in the way in which 
the  external  debt  is  managed.  As  a  commitment  to  prudent  debt 
management,  the  government  now  eschews  short-term  loans  in  its 
borrowing.  Furthermore,  all  external  borrowing  by  the  government, 
government  agencies,  and  state-owned  enterprises  must  be  approved, 
negotiated,  and  administered  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Bank 
Indonesia. By  law,  private Indonesian enterprises are required to report all 
their external borrowing and to hand over the administration of these debts to 
Bank Indonesia. In practice, the government has control only over official 
borrowing. This state of affairs is due in small part to underreporting by  the 
private sector and in large part to the Indonesian government’s pledge of 
maintaining an open capital account. 
There is close collaboration between the Ministry of  Finance and Bank 
Indonesia  in  managing  the  external  debt.6  In  addition  to  monthly  and 
detailed quarterly reports on changes in  the external debt, Bank Indonesia 
also  submits a  weekly  report  of  its  external-debt-related activities to  the 
Ministry of  Finance.  Before any payment of  principal and  interest can be 
made, Bank Indonesia must request approval from the Ministry of  Finance 
which would then recalculate the debt service using  its own records.  The 
slow  computerization of  external  debt  information  unduly  increased  the 
difficulties of  debt management in the early  1980s when  Latin American 
countries  were  slipping  into  debt  crises.  Manual  handling  and  careful 
recalculations meant that as late as  1984, “late  payments [were] frequent, 
resulting in late payment penalties and even defaults”  (Haryono 1985, 229). 
The manual handling of the debt records meant that it was almost impossible 
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change the maturity structure and under different assumptions about foreign 
interest rate and exchange rate developments. 
While the Pertamina crisis was a deep one, it was still manageable. Real 
interest rates were low and Indonesian exports were in high  demand. The 
collapse  of  oil  prices  in  early  1982  and  the  subsequent  collapse  of 
commodity prices have produced a situation which is more ominous. In 1985 
public long-term debt-service ratio went above 20 percent for the first time, 
rising  from  a  ‘‘comfortable’’  15 percent  in  1984  (see  table  7.5).  The 
significant rise in the DSR occurred despite a 38 percent devaluation of the 
rupiah  in  March  1983,  and  the  large-scale  postponement  of  public 
investment  projects  in  fiscal  1983  which  saved  $10  billion  in  foreign 
exchange (World Bank  1987b, 24-25). 
External debt management in the 1980s has also been made more difficult 
by  capital flight. The  (net) errors and omissions item (which contains all 
private  portfolio  flows)  in  the  balance-of-payments  accounts  shows  a 
cumulative deficit of  $6.3 billion  for  1980-85  compared  to  one  of  $1.4 
billion for 1969-79.  Without the loss of reserves from the  1980-85  capital 
flight, the DSR  in 1985 may have been  15 percent instead of  20 percent. 
Two  events  occurred  in  1986  which  worsened  the  debt  situation 
dramatically. The price of  oil dropped precipitously from $28 per barrel  in 
January to $10 in August (World Bank  1987b, 24-25).  The yen, in which 
more  than  a  third  of  Indonesian  public  external  debt  is  denominated, 
appreciated 21  percent  against the  dollar. The  result  was  that  the  public 
debt-service ratio  shot up  to  29  percent  at the  end  of  1986. (If  external 
credits for the expansion of LNG production are included, the ratio stood at 
32 percent.) 
The  Indonesian  government  has  shown  itself  to  be  prepared  to  make 
significant policy changes to ward off an external debt crisis. The rupiah was 
devalued  by  31  percent  in  September  1986,  and,  in  October  1986 and 
January  1987, the  input costs to the export  sector were lowered with  the 
abolition  of  a  substantial  number  of  import  restrictions.  Nominal  state 
expenditure for fiscal  1986 was cut 6 percent from the previous year (see 
table 4.3). In  fact, real government expenditure has been  steadily reduced 
since fiscal 1983. Real expenditure has declined more than the drop in  real 
revenue, reducing the amount of real borrowing (in 1980 prices) from Rp 2.8 
billion in 1983 to Rp 2.1 billion in 1986. Mobilization of domestic resources 
was  also  undertaken to  slash foreign  borrowing-a  value-added  tax  was 
introduced in  April  1985, followed by  a more  comprehensive land tax  in 
June 1986. These tax increases, however, have not been able to make up for 
the fall in oil royalties. Nominal revenue in 1986 was Rp  1.4 billion lower 
than in  1985. Table 7.5  External Debt'  of Indonesia,  1980-86 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
(a) External public and publicly-guaranteed long-term debt 
Debt outstanding and undisbursed 
Debt outstanding and disbursed (DOD) 
Private creditors 







Proportion of  DOD which: 
Is  concessionary 
Bears variable i-rates 
Is from private creditors 
Proportion of  public debt service paid to private creditors 
(b) External private nonguaranteed long-term debt 
Debt outstanding and disbursed 
(c) External short-term debt 
Total external debt 

































































































































Source:  The World Bank's  Wor/d  Debt Tables and Country Reports. Figures do not include LNG expansion credits. 
"Debt reported is end of  period, in  millions of  US. dollars. 
bXGS = export of  goods and services. 